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A Critical Analysis of Europeanism as an Ideology. 
Its Preconditions and Tenets
Abstract
This paper looks at European integration and specifi cally at its institution-
al form – the European Union from an ideological perspective. The author 
claims that ‘Europeanism’ has become a new ideology shared among intel-
lectual, political, judicatory, societal, and even dominant economic elites 
that infl uence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major 
policies. As an ideology, ‘Europeanism’ is a somewhat exotic mixture of 
various, seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Un-
ion its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can 
easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding 
the fi nancial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used 
by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis USA, China, 
or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding inter-
national trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal 
(single market) competition (freedom of labour) one rather quickly spots 
distinct elements of protectionism and over-regulation. Finally, in terms 
of philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, ‘Europeanism’ seems 
to be mostly focusing on the progressive agenda.1
Keywords: European Union, Ideology, Europeanism
Introduction
On December 7, 2017, Martin Schulz, leader of the German Social 
Democrats and former President of the European Parliament, delivered 
* Krzysztof Feliks Śliwiński – Hong Kong Baptist University, e-mail: chris@
hkbu.edu.hk, ORCID: 0000-0001-7316-3714.
1  Brexit – to Deal or not to Deal. Symposium Brexit and the Future of European In-
tegration, http://gis.hkbu.edu.hk/fi les/PublicJuristSpecialIssueBrexitSymposium.pdf 
(access 31.08.2020).
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a speech at the SPD federal party congress calling for the United States 
of Europe by 2025. “I want there to be a constitutional treaty to create 
a federal Europe. […] Once drafted, it would be presented to the member 
states, and those who are against it will simply leave the EU”.2 
Guy Verhofstadt, the former leader of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament, (also the 47th Prime 
Minister of Belgium and the European Parliament’s Brexit Coordinator 
and Chair of the Brexit Steering Group) a passionate federalist, famously 
declared during one of the EP sessions that “You will have to repeat it 
there, telling them that the intergovernmental method is a bad method 
that cannot work. […] We have to abolish it. […] We all know that the 
only way out of this crisis is a new transfer of powers to the European 
Union and to the European institutions”.3
Finally, Donald Tusk former President of the European Council (also 
former Prime Minister of Poland and the leader of the Civic Platform 
party) commenting on the then-ongoing Brexit negotiations stirred much 
criticism, especially in Britain, for uttering this brief sentence: “I’ve been 
wondering what that special place in hell looks like for those who pro-
moted Brexit without even a sketch of a plan how to carry it out safely”.4 
A comment, which was seen by many as a proof of Brussels’s impertinence, 
far removed from expected and often self-proclaimed professionalism.
These three examples are naturally anecdotal and do not prove much. 
At most, they can testify to the fact that political leaders are human be-
ings, and like all of us, they do succumb to emotional states. They are, 
however, quite typical for many among the unabashed supporters of the 
European Union. 
This paper starts with a query regarding the nature of the European 
Union. It posits that the institutional form of European integration has 
achieved by now a peculiar level – tantamount to ideology. In short, it is 
claimed that the proponents of the European Union (intellectual, politi-
cal, judicatory, societal, and dominant economic elites) tend to increas-
ingly see the world and the EU in terms of a Manichean black-and-white 
perspective, whereby there appears no space for nuances and per conse-
quence any critical thinking regarding the European Union.
2  J. Delcker, SPD’s Martin Schulz wants United States of Europe by 2025, “Politico”, 
12 July 2017.
3  G. Verhofstadt, Debates, European Parliament, 28 September 2011, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20110928 
+ITEM-003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (access 29.08.2010).
4  BBC News, Donald Tusk: Special place in hell for Brexiteers without a plan, BBC, 
6. February 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47143135 (access 29.08.2010).
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This paper does not postulate particular actions, much less validate 
any philosophical outlooks. Neither does it analyse the ideological under-
lining of the contemporary European Union and its various institutions. 
Instead, by analysing numerous documents, speeches and actions of mul-
tiple actors, it concludes that the European Union and European integra-
tion have achieved a status equivalent to ideology in its own right. An 
ideology that for lack of a better term is referred thereof as ‘Europeanism’. 
This, in turn, offers much needed explanatory power for all those trying 
to understand contemporary EU and European politics.
In terms of epistemology, the notion of ideology is employed in this 
paper very much against the postulates made by the post-modernists or 
the post-structuralists, in particular, who not only question the classical 
meaning of ideology but even its existence.5 On the contrary, the author 
departs from the assumption that Fukuyama’s thesis is to be defended 
only in so far as he referred to the battle between the capitalist vs commu-
nist ideologies. The ideological battles are still present at the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century which was rightly pointed by Fred Zakaria. 
That is to say, ideology in one form or another seems to be indispensable 
for homo politicus, and perhaps the greatest danger of all is to assume that 
there are no ideologies left.6
Most students of political science are introduced to basic notions such 
as ideology by Andrew Heywood. Accordingly, they are told that “an ide-
ology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for 
organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify 
or overthrow the existing system of power. All ideologies, therefore, have 
among others, the following features: 
a) They offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of 
a ‘world-view.’
b) They advance a model of the desired future, a vision of the ‘good 
society.’
c) They explain how political change can and should be brought about 
– how to get from (a) to (b)”.7
There is, however, several characteristics of ideology that need to be 
borne in mind before we proceed with our analysis. As Brian Turner re-
minds us, ideology is to be seen as a complex process “by which meaning 
is produced, challenged, reproduced, transformed”, “An ideology always 
embodies particular arrangements of power and affects life chances in 
5  T. Eagleton, Ideology An Introduction, Verso, London, New York 2007, p. XX.
6  S. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, London, New York 2008.
7  A. Heywood, Political Ideologies. An Introduction, 3rd ed, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London 2017.
10
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2020
a manner that is different from some other ideology or arrangement of 
power”.8 That is to say, ideologies are peculiar to a certain way of think-
ing. They stem from particular societal, cultural, political or geographical 
circumstances. As such, their pretences to objectivity have to be dismissed 
by default. 
Secondly, and consequently, as Raymond Boudon points out drawing 
on Raymond Aron, ideologies rely heavily not on facts but indeed on val-
ue judgements. As much as facts are demonstrable and therefore can be 
validated, value judgments cannot.9 Value judgements cannot be proved 
true or false. They are susceptible to being correct. At the same time, Bou-
don asserts that ideologies are distinct from other belief systems in the 
way they meet eight specifi c criteria: the explicit nature of their formula-
tion, their wish to rally people to particular positive or normative belief 
(underlined by author), their desire to be different from other belief sys-
tems past or present, their rejection of innovation, the intolerant nature 
of their precepts, the affective way they are promulgated, the adherence 
they demand, and fi nally their association with institutions responsible 
for reinforcing and putting into effect the Belief systems in question.10
Again, none of these allows us to think about ideologies as systematic, 
objective and scientifi c approaches to the comprehension of social phe-
nomena and consequent prescriptions for policymakers.
Thirdly, as van Dijk instructs us, an essential feature of all ideologies 
is that they tend not to be consistent. “Indeed, ideologies are cognitively 
and socially constructed, naive basic ‘theories’ of social life, and especially 
about groups and their relations to other groups”.11 This is an important 
observation as more often than not ideologies prove to be practical yet, 
hardly coherent and logical systems of belief which though serve as pow-
erful tools in the hands of certain groups (groups of power) importantly 
lack the logical rigidity much less fl exibility required by real-life situa-
tions.
Lastly, and correspondingly, as Eagleton asserts, another feature of 
ideology turns our attention to ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) 
which symbolise the conditions and life experiences of a specifi c, socially 
signifi cant (underlined by author) group or class.12 In other words, the 
ideology is close to the idea of a ‘world view’ and as such is characteristic 
8  S.B. Turner, Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006.
9  R. Boudon, The Analysis of Ideology, Polity Press, Oxford 1989, p. 19.
10  Ibidem, p. 20.
11  T.A. van Dijk, Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach, Sage, London 1998, p. 91.
12  T. Eagleton, Ideology. An Introduction, Verso, London 2007.
11
K.F. Śliwiński, A Critical Analysis of Europeanism as an Ideology…
to a particular group of people. The group of people, which is powerful or 
infl uential enough to advertise it and apply in practice.
For reasons of academic honesty and diligence, we note that the term 
‘Europeanism’ has been applied before. Most often cited in this regard is 
much revered John McCormick and his seminal publication titled, nomen 
omen ‘Europeanism’. Published precisely ten years ago, his book remains 
one of those introductory readings for students and practitioners of Euro-
pean integration. Drawing on Habermas and Derrida, McCormick identi-
fi es not fewer than ten (sic!) attributes of ‘Europeanism’. They are the Eu-
ropean identity that supplants nationally based citizenship and patriot-
ism, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, collective society, welfarism, 
sustainable development, redefi nition of the family, post-materialism, 
opposition to capital punishment (greater emphasis on individual rights, 
and a preference for resolving disputes through negotiation rather than 
confrontation through the law), multiculturalism, secularism, perpetual 
peace and last but not least multilateralism.13
Each of these traits is valued positively, and one might even say ‘taken 
for granted’ without much deliberation by the majority of EU citizens, 
policymakers or intellectual elites. However, by the end of the second 
decade of the twentieth century, it seems essential to revisit the subject 
of ideology in and of the European politics and therefore validate these 
claims, which is precisely what this paper intends to do.14 Indeed, the 
last ten years have brought developments that challenge every one of the 
presented attributes, rendering them more postulates rather than actual 
characteristics of existing social phenomena.
‘Europeanism’ – From an Idea to an Ideology
European integration as a project is comparatively juvenile. Com-
menced in 1950 (by the Schuman Declaration) it was initially based as we 
know on pragmatic, mostly economic agenda albeit with crucial politi-
cal foundations and consequently – political ramifi cations. After 69 years 
it has grown substantially to involve several political, institutional and 
ideological elements. 
Adding to the examples cited at the beginning of this paper, French 
President Emmanuel Macron published his vision for the European in-
tegration titled: For European renewal. Addressing all European citizens 
13  J. McCormick, Europeanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010.
14  Due to limited space it is not possible to address and validate each and every 
attribute as proposed by McCormick. Instead a much narrower set of attributes is 
proposed.
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(sic!), Macron paints a bold picture of the future that very much resonates 
with Martin Schultz’s earlier remarks. As in a nutshell, it shows how the 
idea of cooperation instead of competition has evolved into an institu-
tionalised form which, through ‘splill over’ or not, emerged as an overrid-
ing and unchallenged assumption that there is no way back and that more 
integration is always better than less – “We have to stand fi rm, proud and 
lucid, in the face of this manipulation and say fi rst of all what Europe is. 
It is a historic success: the reconciliation of a devastated continent in an 
unprecedented project of peace, prosperity and freedom. We should never 
forget that. And this project continues to protect us today. What country 
can act on its own in the face of aggressive strategies by the major powers? 
Who can claim to be sovereign, on their own, in the face of the digital gi-
ants? How would we resist the crises of fi nancial capitalism without the 
Euro, which is a force for the entire European Union? […] The national-
ists are misguided when they claim to defend our identity by withdrawing 
from Europe because it is the European civilisation that unites, frees and 
protects us”.15 
These lines offer themselves as a useful example of the hypothesis put 
forward at the beginning of this paper, namely that the European integra-
tion has come to function as ideology, which does not have to seek any jus-
tifi cation and supposedly explains it all. Interestingly, Joseph Schumpeter 
foresaw such a phenomenon in the context of bureaucratisation which 
according to him had to, sooner or later, limit the democratic system in 
the name of its effectiveness ultimately leading to the destruction of the 
capitalism altogether.16
This corresponds with the fi rst and second characteristics of ideology 
mentioned earlier. Ideologies are peculiar to a certain way of thinking. 
They stem from particular societal, cultural, political or geographical cir-
cumstances. They embody a peculiar set of world views, which tend to be 
based on specifi c, established combination of elements: fi rstly, since ide-
ologies are meant to give answers to fundamental problems that a particu-
lar society faces, once established they do not lend themselves to criticism 
easily. Secondly, and consequently, they de facto eliminate any alternatives 
by virtue of their dominant position. Thirdly and quite logically, they are 
highly normative as fourthly, they are introduced/imposed by the domi-
nant social power.17 One might perhaps add drawing on Eagleton that 
15  Élysée, For European renewal, March 4 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en (access 29.08.2010).
16  W. Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism. Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of 
Competition, SAGE, Los Angeles 2017, p. 55.
17  T. Eagleton, op. cit., p. 29.
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every ideology needs its champions – particularly passionate individuals 
who command social attention and enjoy high prestige. 
Ideological Preconditions of ‘Europeanism’
‘Europeanism’ asserts its position claiming universality (at least in the 
European context). European values, which seem to make the crucial ele-
ment of its contents are taken for granted and recently used as an instru-
ment in political battles between national governments, various political 
parties representing the right and the left, non-state political actors such 
as NGOs or even EU institutions themselves. 
In May 2018 the European Commission proposed a new mechanism 
to protect the EU budget from fi nancial risks linked to “generalised defi -
ciencies regarding the rule of law” in member states. This would allow the 
Union to suspend, reduce or restrict access to EU funding in a manner 
proportionate to the nature, gravity and scope of the rule of law defi cien-
cies. Such a decision would be proposed by the Commission and adopted 
by the Council through reverse qualifi ed majority voting, making it all 
but impossible for one or two countries to block punitive measures. As the 
Commission elaborately puts it in the document: “[…] In order to protect 
the Union’s fi nancial interests from the risk of fi nancial loss caused by 
generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule of law in a Member State, the 
European Union should be granted the possibility to adopt appropriate 
measures in such cases”.18
Special meeting of the European Council 17–21 July 2020 which de-
cided the next Multiannual Financial Framework – MFF (in the context 
of COVID-19 pandemics), in principle linked the rule of law principle 
with the future budgets of the EU (point 23 of the Council Conclusions).19 
At the same time the majority of parties in the European Parliament, 
including the centre-right European People’s Party, the Socialists 
& Democrats, the liberal Renew, the Greens and the far-left GUE agreed 
on a resolution which openly questioned the EU summit and its labori-
ous compromise: “(the EP) Strongly regrets the fact that the European 
Council signifi cantly weakened the efforts of the Commission and Par-
liament to uphold the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy in 
18  Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council on the protection 
of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule of law in 
the Member States, 2018.
19  See more at: Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18, 19, 20 and 
21 July 2020) – Conclusions, Brussles 21 July 2020, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-10-2020-INIT/en/pdf (access 20.10.2020).
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the framework of the MFF and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instru-
ment; reconfi rms its demand to complete the co-legislator’s work on the 
Commission’s proposed mechanism to protect the EU budget where there 
is a systemic threat to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU, and 
where the fi nancial interests of the Union are at stake; stresses that, to 
be effective, this mechanism should be activated by a reverse qualifi ed 
majority; underlines that this mechanism must not affect the obligation 
of government entities or of Member States to make payments to fi nal 
benefi ciaries or recipients; underlines that the Rule of Law Regulation 
will be adopted by co-decision”.20 
Furthermore, ‘Europeanism’ achieves its universal status by equalising 
the European Union with Europe. Therefore everything that the Euro-
pean Union does as an institution or is proclaimed/conveyed in its name 
becomes European as if it represents the whole of Europe. This has essen-
tial linguistic and psychological ramifi cations. Firstly, it excludes those 
countries that are geographically located in Europe but do not belong to 
the EU, casting doubts over their Europeanness – Island, Switzerland, 
Norway, UK, Serbia or Belarus to name just a few. Secondly, it creates 
an elitist platform providing its members and functionaries with an il-
lusionary conviction that the European Union as a form of international 
cooperation offers the not only economically most effi cient but morally 
highest level of organisation to be emulated by the rest of the world.21
Logically then, there can be no viable alternative to European integra-
tion and the EU. As Euro enthusiasts often put it: if there is no EU, there 
is nationalism, disintegration and war in the end. After all, as one of the 
greatest Euro-enthusiasts, Guy Verhofstadt, known for emotional speech-
es in the European Parliament himself adamantly put it in his book (Eu-
rope’s Last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect 
Union): “«United States of Europe» will be better able to stop the next 
terrorist attack, to respond to the next economic downturn, to listen to 
the voices of the people before it’s too late. Fragmented as it is, Europe 
20  See more at: European Parliament resolution on the conclusions of the extraor-
dinary European Council meeting of 17–21 July 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/B-9-2020-0229_EN.html (access 20.10.2020).
21  As one of many examples of the tendency for the EU pundits to mix Euro-
pean with the EU, please consult: White paper on the future of Europe: Drivers of 
Europe’s Future, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/future-europe/white-paper-fu-
ture-europe/white-paper-future-europe-drivers-europes-future_en. Another telling 
example is the annually worldwide held celebrations of ‘Euorpe Day’/’Journée de 
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today can barely tread water as it fails to respond to the refugee crisis, the 
sputtering economy, and the rise of terrorism and xenophobic politics. 
Devastating internal divisions that limit our ability to respond effectively 
undermine even the seeming unity of scorned Europeans after the Brexit 
vote. Many say that the European Union is at the breaking point, and they 
are right. Yet the solution is not less Union but more. Europe desperately 
requires a new, federal government modeled on the United States…”.22
Lastly, as mentioned before, since it is implied that Europe is the Eu-
ropean Union and vice versa, it reasonably follows that to be European 
automatically means to be an unabashed enthusiast of European Union. 
Conversely, if one raises critical questions regarding the nature of Europe-
an politics within the framework of European integration and specifi cally 
European Union, anti-European attitude is self-evident. For instance, 
quite recently Jan-Werner Müller, a professor of politics at Princeton Uni-
versity, published a representative op-ed at Foreign Policy online, under 
the self-explanatory title: “If You’re Not a Democracy, You’re Not Euro-
pean Anymore”.23 The author claims that by activating the so-called “nu-
clear option” by the European Commission against Poland on December 
20 2017, invoking the article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty: “The commission, 
the offi cial «guardian of the European treaties,» charged that the Polish 
government’s so-called reforms of the judiciary posed a serious threat to 
basic European values, in particular the rule of law” (underlined by au-
thor). He goes on to assert that the action taken by the European Commis-
sion should not be seen as yet another proof of European crisis (or one of 
many crises to be precise) but “If anything, the Commission did the right 
thing for European integration by taking a stand on what exactly the EU 
stands for and what membership in it means. The alternative would have 
been turning a blind eye to a slow erosion of democracy and the rule of 
law in several member states – a process that calls the very core of Euro-
pean integration as a political project into question”.24 
This short extract serves well as an illustration of a particular trait, 
which is shared by most ‘Euro-enthusiasts’. The proponents of European 
integration and by extension of the European Union tend to depart from 
a unique set of assumptions. Firstly, they seem to claim that there is no 
viable alternative to the European Integration and its institutional form. 
22  G. Verhofstadt, Europe’s Last Chance. Why the European States Must Form a More 
Perfect Union, Basic Books, New York 2017, p. 406.
23  J.W. Müller, If You’re Not a Democracy, You’re Not European Anymore, “Foreign 
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In this context, the sole idea of Brexit is seen as irrational. To question 
the European integration and EU, itself is equivalent to going against 
pure reason. Secondly, it implied that almost any criticism of Europe and 
European integration or the EU, especially the one that departs from na-
tional positions, is a proof of ‘right-wing populism’, ‘sovereigntizm’ and 
will inevitably lead to fascism. At the least, it is an effect of deliberate 
misinformation and low level of education not mentioning the emotional 
attitude to politics and traditional (outdated) philosophical outlook ac-
companied by equally obsolete moral code. 
Last but not least as ‘Europeanists’ enthusiastically put forward the 
European Integration is a process and it can only go forward, once it stops 
the EU is bound to fall apart, which will inevitably induce disintegration 
and “cast as back to the dark ages”.25
Exploring ‘Europeanism’ and Its Tenets
Finally, let us have a look at major tenets that feature prominently in 
‘Europeanism’. As an ideology ‘Europeanism’ is a somewhat exotic mix-
ture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give current European 
Union its intriguing characteristics. 
On the one hand, economically, one can quickly identify numerous el-
ements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the fi nancial aspects of Eu-
ropean integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of 
the European integration vis-à-vis USA, China or Japan are of neoliberal 
character.
On October 30 2016, the day of the EU–Canada Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement (CETA) signing, Guy Verhofstadt declared 
on his Facebook account: “I am happy that European and Canadian lead-
ers formally signed their EU–Canada free trade pact today. In times of 
increasing globalisation, a retreat to protectionism will make us poorer. 
We should use agreements like #CETA to set the framework and rules 
for global connectivity ourselves”.26 The then President of the European 
Parliament Martin Schulz and the President of the European Commis-
sion have been also openly enthusiastic, indicating the new “benchmark” 
in EU–Canada relations as well as the “golden standard” in international 
trade agreements.27 The then President of the European Council Donald 
25  T.G. Ash, Brexit is just one front in Europe’s battle for its soul, “The Guardian”, 
9 April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/09/brexit-eu-
rope (access 29.08.2010).
26  See: https://www.facebook.com/GuyVerhofstadt/ (access 29.08.2010).
27  See: https://twitter.com/JunckerEU (access 29.08.2010).
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Tusk went even further, declaring on his Twitter account: “Free trade and 
globalisation have protected humanity from poverty, hunger and total 
confl ict. Few people seems to believe this today”.28
Notably, the list of counterarguments against CETA at a time of 
negotiations was rather lengthy. The many opponents of the CETA be-
tween the EU and Canada prominently feature The Greens–European 
Free Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA), who resolute-
ly oppose CETA for twelve reasons. These reasons are not only funda-
mentally crucial from the procedural standpoint, but they principally 
refer to the content of the agreement. According to The Greens, un-
like in the case of TTIP, during the CETA negotiations the European 
Commission never released the documents before the fi nal text of the 
agreement was published (The Greens/European Free Alliance, 2017). 
The European Parliament members and parliamentarians across Eu-
rope alike could not, therefore, have access to the text. At the same 
time, it was being negotiated, thereby depriving European societies of 
their fundamental right to scrutinise the policy-making process.29 Fur-
thermore, the Green/EFA claims that particularly worrying, are those 
stipulations which provide for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), 
which allows foreign investors to sue nations if they feel that new laws 
or regulations have impacted their businesses.30 Other concerns include: 
locking-in current and further liberalisation, thereby making it very dif-
fi cult (and costly) for countries to bring services back into public own-
ership; increased costs to public healthcare systems due to changes in 
patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs; further contribution to the 
pro-GMO (genetically modifi ed organisms) pressure on the EU regula-
tory processes; weakening the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), which is 
allegedly a crucial piece of law aimed at reducing the EU’s carbon emis-
sions; weakening the rules which aim to benefi t local communities and 
municipalities in terms of employment and sustainability; procuring the 
facilitation of only the “most benefi cial” or “the cheapest offer” mecha-
nisms when tendering; providing no binding rules to protect and im-
prove workers rights and environmental protection; introducing further 
28  See: https://twitter.com/eucopresident (access 29.08.2010).
29  See: R. Aline, “Strange” manoeuvering over CETA exposes democratic defi cit, Eurac-
tiv, 13th October, 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/strange-
maneuvering-over-ceta-exposes-democratic-defi cit/ (access 20.10.2020).
30  This is a particularly controversial mechanism. For more information and 
analysis please see: M. Geist, The devil’s in CETA’s details, specifi cally on dispute settle-
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completion mechanism which will probably affect farmers; containing 
pro-industry provisions which curb the regulatory space for governments 
to act with regard to the Paris Agreement provision limiting CO2 emis-
sions; and, fi nally, expanding foreign investor-rights tenfold, which may 
result in 81% of US subsidiaries in the EU being able to launch ISDS at-
tacks with CETA alone.31
At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural prod-
ucts, intellectual property or internal (single market) competition (free-
dom of labour) one relatively quickly spots distinct elements of pro-
tectionism and overregulation. Historical examples are referring to the 
notorious ‘banana wars, WTO negotiations regarding the international 
trade in agricultural products (the infamous Doha Round) or the ultimate 
failure of the EU to effectively reduce its CO2 emissions within the global 
framework of COP (Conference of the Parties – United Nations Climate 
Change) and its European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
launched in 2005. 
More recently however against the backdrop of economic crisis, In 
September 2019, the European Parliament’s Transport Committee gave 
the ‘green light’ to begin negotiations with the European Commission 
and the Council on rules for reforming the EU’s transport sector. The goal 
is to reach a compromise on the rules known as the “Macron Package”, 
which introduces new regulations for posted drivers, including a higher 
minimum wage and regulation of their stay in hotels. The most conten-
tious issue appears to be the return of empty trucks to their country of 
origin once every four weeks. This would prevent transport companies 
from Central and Eastern Europe from providing their services to the 
market of Western Europe, the so-called “cabotage”.32 Bulgaria, Romania, 
Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania oppose the proposed regulation 
claiming that the obligation to return empty trucks would be an illegal 
protectionist measure that would seriously affect companies in their re-
spective countries, and lead to the loss of jobs and increased economic 
emigration. It appears that it is the Bulgarian representatives who are 
among the most vocal opponents of the contested package. Peter Vitanov 
(Bulgarian Member of the European Parliament) estimated that the Bul-
garian government and the local transport industry should make compro-
mises with some of the changes to negotiate the cancellation of the most 
controversial proposals. “The return of the empty truck [to the country of 
31  Other telling examples of neoliberal characteristics of ‘Europeanism’ might 
include the functioning of the EURO zone and the position of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) or German industries, especially electromechanics and energy.
32  https://euractiv.com/topics/mobility-package (access 20.10.2020).
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origin] is contrary to a fundamental principle [author’s annotation] of the 
EU – the free movement of goods and capital”. This means that Bulgaria 
can begin negotiations to seek a compromise with the threat of a dangling 
court case. “There is no way to oblige anyone to go somewhere else. It is 
contrary to the free market”, according to the Bulgarians. 
The posted workers directive (Directive 96/71/Ec) of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of December 16 1996, concerning the post-
ing of workers in the framework of the provision of services, is illustrative 
in this context. Available data published by the European Commission 
(Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion)33 indicate that Germany, being 
a long-term EU member and a strong economy, receives the most sig-
nifi cant number of posted workers. If we refer to All 15 long-term mem-
bers of the EU, we will see that they all receive high numbers of posted 
workers. On the other hand, all the recently admitted EU member states 
receive much fewer posted workers, which arguably is likely to be the 
consequence of much lower levels of economic development there. It is 
against this backdrop that Bulgaria is expected to seek the cancellation 
of the part of the so-called Mobility package (also known as the Macron 
Package) before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Finally, in terms of philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 
‘Europeanism’ seems to be mostly focusing on the progressive agenda. 
Put within a framework of human rights, sexual minorities seem to get 
unproportionate large attention on the part of liberal-democratic elites 
both at the level of the EU Member States or the EU institutions. 
According to Vocal Europe (a Brussels-based Think Tank, which spe-
cialises in research on EU diplomatic actions, enlargement policy and 
democracy, Europe is currently one of the best if not be the best place 
in the world for LGBTI individuals. Accordingly, eight out of the ten 
most LGBT friendly countries in the world are located in Europe, and all 
are members of the EU.34 Still, especially newer members of the EU are 
frequently criticised by numerous NGO’s and the EU institutions them-
selves for apparently lacking behind in LGBTI friendly regulations. 
Back in February 2014, the European Parliament adopted a resolu-
tion on EU Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (2013/2183(INI)). The 
document calls on the Commission, Member States and relevant agen-
33  See: https://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?pager.offset=0&langId=
en&mode=advancedSubmit&advSearchKey=PostWork (access 20.10.2020).
34  A. Armbrecht, 10 Ways to Improve LGBT Rights in Europe, “Vocal Europe”, 
1 April 2018, https://www.vocaleurope.eu/10-ways-to-improve-lgbt-rights-in-europe-2/ 
(access 29.08.2010).
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cies to work jointly on a comprehensive multiannual policy to protect 
the fundamental rights of LGBTI people, i.e. a roadmap, a strategy or an 
action plan featuring the themes and objectives including mostly non-
discrimination clauses. (European Parliament resolution of February 4, 
2014, on the EU Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (2013/2183(INI)). 
Consequently, the Commission published a list of priorities shortly after-
wards.35 Furthermore, in December 2015 it published the List of Actions 
to Advance LGBTI Equality to move LGBTI equality forward. European 
Council adopted the fi rst-ever conclusions on LGBTI equality in June 
2016 requiring the Commission to annually report on the implementa-
tion of the list of actions, which was duly followed by the Commission.36
As of 2020, European Commission boasts a whole range of initiatives 
and activities that promote LGBTI friendly environment. From anti-
discrimination legislation in the context of employment, through estab-
lishing a Platform of Diversity Charters to encourage businesses, pub-
lic bodies and non-profi t organisations to strengthen their commitment 
to improving diversity. Importantly, in 2016 the European Commission 
agreed with Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft on a code of con-
duct which asks them to review the majority of notifi cations of illegal 
hate speech within 24 hours and to remove such content if necessary. In-
stagram, Snapchat, Dailymotion and jeuxvideo.com signed up to the code 
of conduct in 2018 and 2019. Finally, the Commission supports LGBTI 
directly or indirectly through funding civil society and in particular those 
NGOs that promote LGBTI rights such as IGLA-Europe (International 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association-Europe).37
All this engagement prompts researchers to investigate the role of LGBTI 
in the context of European/EU politics. So much so that as Slootmaeckers 
claims, the EU has been effectively building its identity around LGBT 
promotion. Accordingly, The European Union sees itself as a beacon of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender friendliness and seeks to promote 
these norms in its external relations.38 This latter aspect is very relevant 
35  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combat-
ting-discrimination/tackling-discrimination_en (access 20.10.2020).
36  See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/16/ep-
sco-conclusions-lgbti-equality/ (access 20.10.2020).
37  See: Spotlight on the EU and the LGBTI Equality, https://op.europa.eu/webpub/
com/factsheets/lgbti/en/ (access 20.10.2020).
38  K. Slootmaeckers, Constructing European Union Identity through LGBT Equal-
ity Promotion: Crises and Shifting Othering Processes in the European Union Enlargement, 
“Political Studies Review”, 18(3)/2020, pp. 346–361, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1478929919877624.
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in terms of EU public policy outside Europe where admittedly the LGBTI 
rights promotion is frequently received less enthusiastically due to cul-
tural differences.
Conclusions
As an ideology ‘Europeanism’ can be seen therefore as a somewhat 
incomprehensible amalgamate of seemingly clashing ingredients. What 
seems to bond these is once again a peculiar conviction on the part of 
European political elites (both EU Member states and EU institutions), 
mostly based historically, that Europe/EU represents the highest, most 
advanced and fairest level of socio-economic cooperation in the interna-
tional system. This conviction is self reproductive in no small extent. It 
manifests itself with three distinct, yet logically intertwined (albeit gen-
uinely indigenous and therefore highly subjective) three premises that 
seem to hold absolute value for the disciples of ‘Europeanism’. Firstly, 
most if not everything that is EU/European related is of positive value. 
Secondly, and consequently, most if not everything that is EU/European 
related is positive for all parties involved. If not in the short term, then 
in the long term. Thirdly, most if not everything that is EU/European 
related brings an added value to the whole world.
Other related aspects of ‘Europeanism’ that beg thorough and sys-
tematic queries involve European identity, which was briefl y mentioned 
before, the role of ‘Europeanism’ pundits (increasingly academics them-
selves, who tend to depend increasingly on European Union funding for 
the development of their careers), the interpretation of the founding trea-
ties and their subsequent amendments, or fi nally, the role of the judges of 
the Court of Justice the European Union (‘judgization’) in shaping Euro-
pean policies.
One cannot but notice a certain level of cognitive bias among many of 
the ‘Euro enthusiasts’ which to a large degree fuel the phenomenon of ‘Eu-
ropeanism’. When reality does not conform with the theory, they tend to 
criticise reality. They simply do not accept it as such and consequently cre-
ate all kinds of reasons to support the theory. In other words, in case of any 
disparity between reality and theory, for the ‘Europeanists’ the only imag-
ined way is the way forward, which is to apply more of the same. Previous 
immigration crisis of 2015 seems to be a rather telling example. Likewise, 
COVID-19 pandemics has clearly shown that Euro enthusiasts will call 
for more integration claiming that the apparent weakness of the EU in 
the face of the COVID-19 disaster is rooted in the lack of political power 
transferred to the EU and, consequently, still too much power retained by 
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the EU Member States. In other words, the current weakness of the EU is 
called upon to be proof of an urgent need for more Union in the EU.
Correspondingly, Eurosceptics will claim that the current health and 
economic problems most EU Members face are caused by the apparent 
‘Brusselization’ of European politics, which further fuels Euro-scepti-
cism. Crisis as such time and again proves to be a potent accelerator of 
ideological differences.
Žižek unmistakably reminds us how the very notion of post-ideology 
can enable the deepest, blindest form of ideology. A sort of false conscious-
ness or false cynicism, engaged in for the purpose of lending one’s point 
of view the respect of being objective, pretending neutral cynicism, with-
out truly being so. Rather than help avoiding ideology, this lapse only 
deepens the commitment to an existing one.39
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